resignation

Donald Trump craves two things: to win, constantly, and, slightly less obviously, to be accepted. Wolff’s new book, and even a brief peruse of his twitter feed, shows us that for all his weird wants and wishes, it is these two things that drive him, and his failure to do either that drives him to distraction.

Wanting these things isn’t unusual. All presidents want to win and probably more than would admit want some form of affirmation. The problem for Trump is that the winning and acceptance simply isn’t happening. Instead, one year on from his inaugural speech that even George W. Bush thought was ‘some weird s##t’, Trump has become a loser. He is roundly mocked and abused by the press and establishment he wants to be adored by. The new book paints a vivid portrait of a lonely and strange figure, moaning at the state of the White House plumbing while shouting abuse at three TV screens, half-eaten cheeseburger in hand. Very, as it were, sad.

Trump clearly lacks the self-control, the emotional intelligence or, Wolff claims, the basic comprehension to do what needs to be done to win or be accepted. Like Nixon, Trump is consumed, so utterly consumed, by his rage and resentments at the elite who despise him that he only makes it worse. Wolff claims Trump is a ‘real life fictional character’, a ghost of a racist play acting demagogue, echoing JFK’s famous observation that Nixon ‘had to reinvent his personality everyday’. His habits also call to mind another JFK put down of Nixon: ‘no class’ (I’d encourage you to read the very wonderful ‘Nixon at the Movies’ by Mark Feeney).

Interestingly, ‘Fire and Fury’ claims Trump is obsessed not only by Obama but two other famous political figures: Lyndon Baines Johnson and John W. Dean. Johnson was, of course, the supreme doer of deals, the legislative maestro and the great civil rights reformer- everything Trump is not. One can only presume that the current racist in chief likes Johnson’s style rather than his politics. John W. Dean is even more interesting still. He was Nixon’s White House Counsel who, fearing he was to be made the Watergate scapegoat, co-operated and gave evidence to the investigating committee in a blaze of damning publicity. Why, I wonder, would Trump fixate upon someone with knowledge of something turning against him and going public?

The big question Wolff’s book raises is how will it all end? Even Bannon was unsure that Trump would make a full term. Commentators are plumbing for either the 25th amendment or impeachment.

The 25th amendment looks unlikely. It’s never been used and looks like some bizarre, terrible nuclear weapon of an open ended process: ‘no, you go tell Trump he’s mentally unfit for office and see how he reacts’. Some sort of mass Cabinet resignation, as with Zachary Taylor, could happen but, again, where would it get us?

Impeachment seems even less likely. No president has been successfully impeached. Andrew Johnson in 1868 and Bill Clinton in 1998 survived their Senate votes and Nixon jumped in advance. How will it be triggered? Trump has publically supported Nazis (twice with his defence of the Charlottesville racists and Far Right retweeting) and admitted to sexual assault. It’s not clear what it is he needs to do, or indeed what is left to do, to get the Republicans to remove him. And if they ever summon up the courage, it takes time.

The Russia collusion would make a promising impeachment case, but it needs proof. Remember, Nixon was caught by his own recordings, not the allegations. Whatever collusion happened, it needs to have been written down or taped and, most of the time, I think no one’s that stupid (step forward Donald Trump Jr’s emails and Trump’s odd ‘recording’ tweet). That is unless, as Wolff claims, the Trump family fear the investigation turns up something else even uglier hiding in their accounts.

But there is a third option. What Wolff’s book also alleges is that Trump never intended, and didn’t want, to win in 2016. He now sits, in an odd reversal of King Lear, as someone granted huge power who never wanted it. Could he just give up? He clearly has a powerful dissonance capacity but somewhere, somehow, does he suspect he’s not winning? Do his raging tweets not hint that he knows things ain’t going well?

Three Presidents in living memory have given up. Truman decided not to run in 1952, though he could have. LBJ refused to accept the Democratic nomination in 1968. And Nixon resigned in 1974, of course, before he was removed. All of them faced plummeting popularity and poll numbers and so side stepped humiliation. Could Trump do the same? And what can be done to make him go?

First, we should continue to point out regularly that he is a loser. By any available metric he is an abject failure. His polling numbers are the worst since records began and worsening (even among his base). In legislative terms he is a loser-all he did was create a huge tax break that the public are against. Most presidents have six months, as Rupert Murdoch supposedly warned him, to do something. But Trump’s early nights and golf (see here) means no wall, an uncertain and globally despised Muslim ban and no Obamacare repeal. When he throws his support behind someone, such as alleged molester Roy Moore, they lose too. Trump’s coattails are actually banana skins.  The numbers look even worse if you compare them with Obama. His legislative agenda and polling numbers were impressive, the sort you’d expect from a winner (he’s even globally popular). Indeed, a majority of these voters wish he was on his third term.

Second, we should emphasise Trump’s unacceptability and continue to hammer away at it. He supports some of history’s biggest losers. He makes no secret of his regard for the Confederacy-and that crazy gang in the White House ‘jokingly’ referred to Trump’s Attorney General by his middle name Beauregard (a Confederate civil war general). In words and deeds, he trolls and targets minorities and the vulnerable. Trump has denied he is a racist, though I’m not sure exactly what his definition is. I take the old fashioned, classic approach of ‘does he say and do racist things?’ When the press must ask ‘are you a racist?’ repeatedly and both the UN and African Union describe you as a racist, I think we can be reasonably sure you are a racist.  And then there’s women and what he said and the (22) allegations. The idea that Trump has some form of provocative, clever strategy must, by now, be over. He says and does racist things, says and does fascist things because that’s what he is.

Will it work? It’s not clear. But is it not worth a try? The chance to push him out of office? Can we make him do the long, slow, painful walk to the waiting helicopter and the longer, inevitable trip to the dustbin of history? As either Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela or Pliny the Younger said ‘everything looks impossible until it’s done’.

Listen to the Westminster Watch predictions for politics 2018 here where we cover May’s fate, the EU and the special relationship.

It also includes a review of our guesses from 2017(listen here to the December 2016 podcast) and a series of polite disagreements as to what will or won’t happen. The podcast will help with many of your burning Yuletide questions such as:

  • Who or What is a ‘Post-Blairite Bridge’?
  • Where is the ‘Gordon Brown Zone’?
  •  Which of us coined the term ‘Trump-Made-Twitter-spat’?

 

Image from CloudFM group

Image from CloudFM group

by Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos

Upon reading this headline, one would be forgiven for thinking that a publication that is often referred to as a ‘rag’, cares deeply about ordinary Brits’ income and so is the Conservative Party’s Europhobic (current) majority.  In reality though, they like to hide behind the veil of nationalism so as to conceal its market fundamentalism.  This is why they love to hate the EU’s Working Time Directive.  That directive is part of an enduring effort made by a previous coalition of national and EU-level political actors to use the collective force of the European Union to ‘humanise’ capitalism as we – citizens of the EU – face it in our daily lives.

Originally enacted in 1993, it was extended to a larger number of workers in 2000 and was subsequently codified in 2003.  It contains basic provisions such as daily and weekly limits to the number of hours that workers can be required to work, a legal right to four weeks of paid annual holidays, legal rights to regular health checks for those who work during the night (an activity that is directly associated with ill health), rest breaks, etc.  Two key points are often missed when that directive is discussed in Britain.  First, it – just like several other pieces of EU legislation – sets minimum standards (i.e. a ‘floor’ below which member states are not allowed to go) but allows EU member states that want to enact higher levels of protection to do so.  Second, the individual opt-out that it contains allows individual workers to work for more than 48 hours per week if they so wish but this is a clause that is often abused in the UK where the culture of long working hours persists.

The original directive was enacted despite vehement opposition from the Conservative British governments of the first half of the 1990s.  Later on Tony Blair’s New Labour administrations fought tooth and nail to prevent the abolition of the individual opt-out which it (still) contains.  But behind the veneer of ‘British’ opposition, a rather different picture exists – indeed, one about which the Murdoch press does not appear keen to inform its readers but also one that offers awkward reading for supporters of what is misleadingly called ‘Lexit’.

As my own ESRC-funded research has demonstrated, when the New Labour transposed that directive in UK law and then implemented it, they made choices that reflected the then government’s ideological orientation.  For example, they transposed the directive into UK law in a way that enabled it to cover many more workers than was legally necessary.  They could have done much more along those lines but chose not to.  That was the government’s choice.  As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the same happened in France.  In other words, membership of the EU did not prevent parties that place themselves on the Left of the political spectrum to a) act in ways that was consistent with their ideological orientation and b) in one way or another different from parties of the Right.  Moreover, a comparison of these two countries has revealed differences between them too: when in government, New Labour’s stance was less worker-friendly than the stance of the French Socialist Party; the French Right did not question the involvement of public authorities in the regulation of working time, while the British Conservatives still believe that this should be left to the market: a matter for direct negotiations between the individual employers and employees.

Over the week-end, this idea – that the amount of time a worker can be required to work should be left to the marketplace – was, yet again, presented in a way that feeds into a particular narrative not only about the EU but about the economy as well.  On that instance, the Sun was simply copying (!) a Frenchman, a descendant of immigrants, no less: Nicolas Sarkozy, the right-winger who won the 2007 French presidential election by promising to French workers to enable them to ‘travailler plus pour gagner plus’.  What they subsequently discovered was that his actual policies were not exactly worker-friendly, as demonstrated by the sweeping reform of French labour laws enacted by the Fillon-led governments of the Right.  Just like in France, the Sun’s narrative, in addition to the numerous factual mistakes that it contained, reflected the idea that public authorities are by definition fetters, not promoters of material progress; workers ought to compete against each other (come what may) so as to earn more irrespective of the negative consequences that the non- or light-touch regulation of working time can have on their health, family life, etc.  Of course, this kind of discourse also helps many employers hide their antiquated practices that foster instead of combatting low productivity.  Ironically and revealingly, GDP per hours worked is far higher in France than it is in the UK.

Brexit_WEB

The issue of whether the government would allow Parliament a vote (it seems as though it will) and whether any such vote will be meaningful (it won’t be) has dominated Brexit coverage since the referendum. This has been a distraction from the main event – not least because the EU Withdrawal Act makes any vote meaningless. When the Conservatives and Labour whipped their MPs in the same direction, they whipped away Parliament’s power and gave it to the EU and UK government.

The place where Parliament has actually had most success is not  taking back control of what’s happening, but actually finding out what’s going on (or not going on). This was symbolised by the apparent success last month in forcing the government to release the 58 studies about the likely economic impact of Brexit.

MPs and the public first got wind of these ‘studies’ back in the summer when David Davis mentioned them on the Andrew Marr show: (see p.11 of this transcript):

“That  data’s  being  gathered,  we’ve  got  50,  nearly  60  sector  analyses already done, we’ve got planning work going on in the customs,  we’ve  got  planning  work  going  on  22  other  issues  which  are  critical,  127  all  told.  All  of  them  have  got  to  be  grounded  before  we come to a conclusion what it looks like.”

Repeated FOI requests for the studies by the MEP Molly Scott Cato and others failed, as the government appeared to argue it would undermine their ability to negotiate (and there are certain protections under FOI that might support this rather bland statement).

In November, Labour then used an obscure piece of parliamentary procedure to force the government into releasing its Brexit impact studies, as this blog by Andrew Defty explains. Using a motion for a return, Labour ‘transformed a non-binding opposition day motion into a binding resolution of the House’ (see more on these here in this 1999 report Section 3 (ii)).

However, the government then responded with an admission (or confession) that the ’50’ or ‘60’ – or possibly 127 – pieces of analysis are not what they seem: “As we have made clear, it is not the case that 58 sectoral impact assessments exist”. The statement went on to explain that the papers are a

“… wide mix of qualitative and quantitative analysis, contained in a range of documents developed at different times since the referendum. It examines the nature of activity in the sectors, how trade is conducted with the EU currently in these sectors and, in many cases, considers the alternatives after we leave as well as looking at existing precedents. This analysis ranges from the very high level overarching analysis to sometimes much more granular level analysis of certain product lines in specific sectors.”

At some point, a discerning reader could conclude, Davis was being ‘economical with the truth’. Either the impact studies exist (or existed) in some form, or they didn’t. It now seems that ‘Brexit studies’ doesn’t mean, as it were, ‘Brexit studies’. And whatever they are, they won’t be fully released (though the ultimate power may lie with the DExEU committee here).

Back in July of 2016, when Brexit meant Brexit and Theresa May had a majority, her new government asserted that it was for government to declare and trigger article 50 and then conduct the subsequent negotiations in a confidential way. The government were keen to keep things closed and secret. There was to be, famously, no running commentary.

In September 2016 Davis, the new secretary of state for Brexit, made it clear the limitations of any openness, saying he would be “as open as I can. More accurately, the Government will be as open as they can”. He argued that it may be ‘the most complicated negotiation ever’ but there would be ‘debates, reports by Select Committees and hearings’ and he promised:

“We will certainly match and, hopefully, improve on what the European Parliament sees. At given times, that will be tactical, I am afraid. I do not want to be boring about it, but this is likely to be the most complicated negotiation of modern times. It may be the most complicated negotiation of all times. By comparison, Schleswig-Holstein is an O-level question. We will not always be entirely free agents, but we will be as open as we can be.”

He also spoke of the impossibility of secrecy:

“… I will seek to be as open as is possible…Even were I to decide that I was going to behave like Rasputin and keep it all entirely secret, I would fail. It would not be possible… other Governments would do it. In the Government’s own interest, it is a better idea to be more open than is perhaps traditional, but always subject to the overriding point that we cannot pre-empt the negotiation.”

 In October the report from the House of Lords EU Select Committee took a rather stronger view of what right Parliament had (2016).

“One of the key objectives of parliamentary scrutiny is to ensure transparency – to cast a light on the actions of the executive. It is, we suggest, essential that many elements of the forthcoming negotiations – for instance, negotiations affecting acquired rights, or future cooperation between UK and EU police forces—should be conducted transparently.” (House of Lords EU 2016a).

Since then, Parliament has been the key to shining more light on Brexit. The sheer volume of investigation and scrutiny can be seen below:

Scrutiny of Brexit by Parliament, 13 July 2016 – 19 June 2017

Written questions 490
Written answers 819
Select committee inquiries begun 55

(House of Commons/UK Parliament: IFG)

 

Select committees launched more than 55 inquiries into various aspects of Brexit, though some were curtailed by the June 2017 General Election. In December 2016, the Liaison Committee was the first body to subject the Prime Minister to detailed scrutiny of the government position on Brexit revealing, perhaps inadvertently, that her approach was one of secrecy and that she appeared unaware of how exactly article 50 functioned. In one day in November 2017, in a ‘bumper day for select committees’, six select committees questioned different officials and Ministers on various aspects of Brexit. In March 2017, the new DExEU Select Committee scrutinised the government’s objectives and positions and questioned Davis, who confessed there had been no preparation for what would happen in the event of Brexit talks breaking down and that any financial settlement will favour the EU. The debate around the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) bill from January to March 2017, triggered by the Supreme Court ruling, also gave a focus to discussion and debate and revealed more about the prospects and government plans.

All this pressure has given us far more information that the government seemed prepared to give before. We have had two major Prime Ministerial speeches and one, heavy, evidence session (with another due December 20 this year). Ministers have appeared and explained (and sometimes contradicted each other) regularly. We’ve also had a Brexit White Paper (that, you’ll be pleased to know, gave us all 14 weeks holiday a year).

Brexit has not, of course, been fully opened up by Parliament. The government refused some of the more transparent options, such as a cross-party approach via Royal Commission, in 2016 and again in 2017. The January White Paper was described as ‘largely devoid of content because the UK government’s concern about negotiating secrecy’ and offered ‘as few concrete positions as it is possible to imagine’. The government also resisted Parliamentary motions to mandate regular updates on Brexit to Parliament in the future.

Nevertheless, Parliament was key in forcing appearances. Far more is known than before, and benchmarks have been lain down with the legislature’s action leading to far greater understanding of the government’s views and preparation. And here is what has proved so damaging: the lack of preparation. Westminster’s digging and pressure have revealed not what has been done but what has not been done. There is no hidden grand plan, but a void at the heart of government thinking on the most important event in the last 60 years. And this is what the ‘58’ studies symbolise. As General Montgomery once said: “I have not been told of any master plan and I must therefore assume there was none.”

See my paper ‘Brexit and Open Government in the UK: 11 Months of May’ (June 19, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2988952

As the Exiting the European Union Committee (once more) debates the 58 Brexit Studies with David Davis, two Birkbeck Politics academics reflect on what the struggle between Westminster and the government tells us about power, Parliament and Brexit.

social_card

Dr Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos

Governing is (perhaps) not what it used to be but there are some things that have not changed much.  The possession and significance of privileged information is one of them.  Distributing and (more broadly) utilising sensitive information is part of the tools of government.  That is why one of the most significant concerns of parliaments in democracies is getting hold of this information.  Without it, there is no way they can hold government to account.  But even in the absence of this oversight, the credibility of a government’s position is at stake. Without credible information (indeed, without information that is known to be credible), how can a government formulate good public policy?  This was at the heart of the previous coalition government’s now forgotten review of the balance of competences between the UK and the EU. A key reason why it was barely mentioned after its conclusion was the fact that it did not fit the narrative that the Conservatives wanted to construct in relation to the UK’s membership of the EU. The credibility of government-held information is more important in the context of controversial negotiations like the one that the UK government is currently conducting with the European Union (first) in relation to the terms of the UK’s exit.  A large part of the controversy that surrounds the referendum is built on the systematic use of lies by supporters (including ministers) of the winning side.  Now that they must deliver on their promises, the fundamental weakness of their arguments is beginning to show.  This is demonstrated, for example, by the government’s acceptance of the EU’s preferred sequencing and the reported acceptance of the EU’s calculation of the UK’s legacy debts (usually and misleadingly referred to as ‘exit bill’), i.e. the expected costs to which the UK has agreed whilst still a member of the EU.

Until the earth-shattering news of Meghan Markle’s engagement to Prince Harry, the debate inside the UK on the ongoing Brexit negotiations was dominated by the thorny issue of Northern Ireland and the impact of Brexit on the British economy.  The British Parliament managed to extract from the government a commitment to share hitherto unpublished sectoral studies that assess Brexit’s likely impact on several sectors of the British economy.  The latest twist in this sorry and lengthy saga – which highlights, instead of concealing, as the UK’s Conservative government intended, the weakness of its negotiating position – saw the government effectively refuse to reveal this information to British parliamentarians.

This may come as a surprise to many but it is perfectly in keeping with both the country’s enduring constitutional settlement and the Conservative Party’s – especially its loudly Eurosceptic wing’s – duplicitous stance on the issue of parliamentary sovereignty.  Although Westminster is frequently referred to as ‘the mother of all parliaments’ one must be careful for the system is neither balanced, nor is it characterised by the centrality of Houses of Commons and Lords that its title suggests.  As early as 1867, Walter Bagehot was observing that ‘[i]n England a strong Cabinet can obtain the concurrence of the legislature in all acts which facilitate its administration; it is itself, so to say, the legislature’.  He noted that ‘[t]he efficient secret of the English Constitution may be described as the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative powers’.  One of the ways in which this fusion is achieved is highlighted in RHS Crossman’s famous introduction to the 1963 edition of Bagehot’s classic book:

Once elected by the Commons the Prime Minister exerts power greater than those of any American President […] In this new middle class regime, in fact, the nation is run by a board of control headed by a powerful managing director’.

But even if one ignores the real and enduring balance of power between the British executive and legislature, it would be unreasonable to expect a UK government to bend to the will of parliament on matters European given the historical precedent.  As I have argued in detail in an article in the Journal of Common Market Studies, acting in a comparable context in the early 1990s again under a Conservative government with a slim majority in the House of Commons, an arrangement put in place in 1980 obliged the government of the day to (normally) refrain from giving its assent to EU legislative proposals as long as the parliamentary scrutiny of these proposals in Westminster had not been completed.  Crucially though, the government retained the right to decide that due to ‘special reasons’ – agreement at the level of the EU need not be withheld (House of Commons Debates, vol. 991, 30 October 1980, col. 843). It was – and is – up to the government of the day to make that decision and all they need to do is simply explain these reasons in Parliament.  In other words, one should not be surprised by the current government’s stance. It is consistent with the essence of the UK’s constitutional arrangement as well as the ruling party’s tradition, no matter what Conservative Eurosceptics said when they were not running the country.  If Brexit is about ‘taking back control’, why not share with our elected representatives these impact studies?

In reality, the current government’s real problem lies in either a) the really bad news that these studies would reveal to the British public or b) the weakness of way in which these studies were constructed.  Either way, the government’s dogged fight to conceal them is much more revealing than they want it to be.

Follow the author and Birkbeck’s Politics Department on Twitter: @DGDimitrakop @bbkpolitics

Waterloo Bridge Towards Palace of Westminster

In episode 38 of our politics podcast, Dr Dermot Hodson and Dr Ben Worthy reflect on some emerging data about the June 2017 General Election and on the instability in Ireland’s supply and confidence arrangements-listen in here https://soundcloud.com/british-politics-centre/westminster-watch-episode-38-elections-supplies-and-confidence-with-a-brexit-coda

You can read the paper we discuss (and, of course, draw your own conclusions) here:

Mellon, Jonathan and Evans, Geoffrey and Fieldhouse, Edward A. and Green, Jane and Prosser, Christopher, ‘Brexit or Corbyn? Campaign and Inter-Election Vote Switching in the 2017 UK General Election’ (November 17, 2017). Available to download at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3073203

Women-MPs

In this episode of Birkbeck Voices, we’re joined by Sarah Childs, Professor of Politics and Gender at Birkbeck.

Professor Childs discusses the benefits of equal gender opportunity in parliament, the current system of quotas for women in politics and a report she recently put forward that recommends a change to the law on job-sharing for MPs. She has worked extensively on representation theory and policies surrounding gender politics and currently advises the new Commons Reference Group on Representation and Inclusion(www.parliament.uk/business/committ…ation-inclusion/).

Listen here https://soundcloud.com/birkbeck-podcasts/the-rise-of-the-female-politician-how-gender-equality-is-permeating-parliament

Read this recent piece by Sarah Childs, Jessica Smith and Meryl Kenny on the 2017 election ‘Women and the 2017 Parliament: scratching, rather than smashing the glass ceiling’ http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/women-and-the-2017-parliament/

Waterloo Bridge Towards Palace of Westminster

In episode 37 of our politics podcast, Dr Dermot Hodson and Dr Ben Worthy reflect on the power of the Prime Minister to hire and fire and the constitutional crisis in Northern Ireland. Just another week in UK politics-listen in here http://bit.ly/2ii3Cxp

You can read the paper on Prime Ministerial power by Allen and King that we mention here. You can also read some reflections on the border difficulties here and some scenarios for Northern Ireland here

 lgbt flag

by Hendrik Kraetzschmar (University of Leeds) and  Barbara Zollner (Birkbeck College)

In a recent crackdown on Egypt’s LGBTQ community, the authoritarian regime of President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi is showing its fear of any expressions of personal freedom, particularly those by young Egyptians who lived through the Arab Spring.

The latest spate of arrests across Egypt was triggered when a handful of fans waved rainbow flags to celebrate LGBTQ pride during a concert in Cairo by the Lebanese band Mashrou’ Leila in late September. After an initial media storm of hostility, the Ministry of Interior declared that the act amounted to inciting homosexuality and was an offence punishable under Egypt’s infamous public morality laws.

The arrests that followed targeted those who were thought to have carried the rainbow flags during the concert, alongside others suspected of being LGBTQ or who sympathised with ideas of personal liberties – even if they had not been at the concert. Since the arrests, around 20 people have so far been sentenced, receiving prison terms of up to six years.

Human rights NGOs and a number of Egyptian activists condemned the executive and judiciary for its heavy-handed actions. They accused the state of making illegal arrests, of subjecting some detainees to degrading examinations and torture and of undermining the possibility of a fair legal process by pandering to a public bias against homosexuality.In their support for those arrested and charged, however, these NGOs did not tackle the issue of prevailing homophobia in Egypt head-on, bringing into stark relief the ongoing stigma associated with being LGBTQ in the country. Even so, the president of Egypt’s parliament demanded that the NGOs be charged with treason.

All this amounts to a calculated “divide and rule” strategy by the al-Sisi regime, playing on conservative religious attitudes to single out the LGBTQ community as a legitimate target. The government’s objective is to ingratiate itself with the country’s conservative mainstream, while at the same time constraining personal liberties and silencing liberal views.

According to the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, 232 people suspected of being LGBTQ have been arrested by the authorities, since al-Sisi seized power in 2013.

What the law says

The legal framework for prosecuting people in Egypt for their sexuality is a grey area. Under the Egyptian penal code, the sexual conduct between people of the same gender is not subject to criminal proceedings.

In the past, the Egyptian courts have used both Article 98f of the penal code, which criminalises blasphemy, as well as the vaguely formulated 1961 Supplementary Law Number 10 against prostitution and debauchery to prosecute LGBTQ people in a number of high profile cases. Yet convictions under these laws have been relatively limited.

In 2001, the Queen Boat incident saw 52 people arrested at a private party in Cairo, of which 21 were eventually handed three-year jail sentences. Two years later, 62 men were rounded up by police on Cairo’s Nile Bridge, which was widely seen as a cruising area for LGBTQ people. In 2013, a downtown bathhouse in Cairo was searched and 26 men were accused of debauchery, but later cleared of all charges.

More recently, authorities have begun using Article 178 of the Criminal Code, which refers to the manufacture, possession, and distribution of any kind of material which violates “public morality”. This clause was introduced during the rule of Egypt’s former leader Hosni Mubarak to give legal room for the persecution of his political opponents. It has been used to curtail online activities of those critical to the Mubarak and al-Sisi regimes. Along with other laws on public morality and decency, the current regime has developed a broad set of legal tools to expose, prosecute and try rights activists and members of the LBGTQ community.

Following the recent arrests, members of the LGBTQ community in Egypt were urged to delete apps such as Grindr and social media messages on their mobile phones that could be used against them in future prosecutions under these laws.

Illiberal impulses

The al-Sisi regime regards people with non-heteronormative sexuality as perverse and a danger to public morality for breaking with Egypt’s socio-religious norms. Religious attitudes in Egypt have hardened in recent decades to a more orthodox interpretation of Islam, driven largely by growing Salafi, Salafi-Wahhabi and Muslim Brotherhood influence. The LGBTQ community is now often depicted as spear-heading a Western liberal conspiracy that aims to undermine the moral fabric of society and the state.

Ever since al-Sisi came to power, his government has been fixated on undercutting any opposition and on restraining any countenance of personal freedoms. Paradoxically, this comes from a regime that presents itself as outwardly secular, yet uses religious populism at home to shore up the support of religious conservatives and right-wing nationalists.

The clampdown on the LGBTQ community extends this authoritarian logic by repressing those who appear to fall outside of the regime’s definition of the norm. Egypt’s leaders worry that the push for personal freedoms could be contagious. The arrests are indicative of a much deeper fear within the regime of the influence of liberal views, freethinking and self-expression.

This article was originally on The Conversation

Disappearance of the Battlefield 3

Dr Antoine Bousquet has published a new article on the evolution of military conflict and the nature of modern battlefields.

Dr Bousquet writes: “The image of the battlefield is one that exerts a powerful hold on our collective imagination. It immediately evokes in our minds the sight of massed troops clashing furiously with each other, culminating in a decisive outcome that determines the fate of a wider conflict. However, such military confrontations have largely vanished from the contemporary landscape of war.”

The article can be read in full on Aeon.